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A Comprehensive Instrument for Identifying Critical Information 
Infrastructure Services 
Abstract: 
The identification of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) services has become a top 
priority for governments and organizations, and a crucial component of a sound cyber 
security policy. As the interconnectivity of essential services spreads, the probability of 
disruptions increases and with it the vulnerability of all Critical Infrastructure (CI) sectors 
public and private. The impact of an undue interruption of essential services may develop 
in a devastating cascading effect and the collapse of a country’s infrastructures system. 
The purpose of this work is to introduce an original comprehensive instrument that 
supports the escalated identification of CII services on the basis of three analytical 
components: the identification of main stakeholders, as an accurate terminology for 
establishing a common understanding of the terms; the calculating process for criticality 
ranking that works as an adaptable matrix; and, an illustrative framework called the 360-
DEGREE-FEEDBACK that applies the complete perspective. Terminological 
development preceded the formulation of the instrument considering preliminary findings 
on that the field of CII warrants more clarity and precision, and that the CIIs, despite their 
commonalities with other dimensions of CIs, possess unique characteristics that should be 
assessed independently. The applicability of the instrument is illustrated in a case study of 
Colombia, which is used to exemplify the relationship between two potential essential 
services and map the likely position of them in the table of national protection priorities. 
This study combines qualitative and quantitative methods, benchmarking theoretical 
contributions, and relying mainly on documentary analysis, secondary statistical data from 
official sources, semi-structure interviews and a case study of practical implications. This 
thesis is written in English and is 56 pages long, including 22 figures and 26 tables. 
Keywords: 
Critical Information Infrastructure, Critical Infrastructure, Criticality Criteria, Cyber 
Dependence, Cascading Failure, Information and Communication Technology. 
CERCS: P170 Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control 
Kõikehõlmav tööriist kriitilise infotaristu teenuste identifitseerimiseks 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Kriitiliste Informatsiooni Infrastruktuuride (KII) teenuste kindlaks määramine on üks 
valituste ja organisatsioonide peamisi prioriteete. KII on ühtlasi kaaluka küberturvalisuse 
poliitika kriitiline osa.  Nii avalikus kui erasektoris Kriitilise Infrastruktuuri (KI) 
haavatavus suureneb, sest kasvab omavahel ühilduvate hädavajalike teenuste arv, 
samaaegselt tõuseb ka tõenäosus vahelesegamisteks. Hädavajalike teenuste lubamatute 
vahelesegamiste mõju võib välja viia arenguteni, kus aset leiab hävitav kaskaadeffekt, 
mille tagajärjeks on riikliku infrastruktuurisüsteemi kokkuvarisemine. Antud lõputöö 
eesmärgiks on tutvustada ainulaadset kõikehõlmavat instrumenti, mis toetab eskaleeritud 
KII teenuste kindlaksmääramist, ja põhineb kolmel analüütilisel komponendil. Nendeks 
on: peamiste sidusrühmade kindlaks määramine kui täpne terminoloogia loomaks 
terminitest ühist arusaama; kohaldatava maatriksina töötav kalkuleerimisprotsess kriitiliste 
reastuste otstarbeks; ja, illustratiivne raamistik nimega 360-kraadi-tagasiside, mis  
kinnistab terviklikku lähenemist. Terminoloogiline edasiarendus tuleneb vahendi 
loomisest, mis võtab arvesse esialgseid leide, see tagab KIIde vallas suurema selguse ja 
täpsuse. Unikaalseid tunnusjooni omavad KIId peaksid olema hinnatud iseseisvalt. Seda 
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vaatamata KIIde ühistele joontele KIde teiste tahkudega. Vahendi kohaldatavus on 
näitlikustatud Kolumbia juhtumikirjelduses, kus on illustreerivalt toodud seos kahe 
potensiaalse hädavajaliku teenuse vahel. Juhtumikirjedluses on ühtlasi kaardistatud nende 
tõenäoline paiknemine riikliku kaitse prioriteetide seas. Antud lõputöö kombineerib 
kvalitatiivseid ja kvantiatiivseid meetodeid, sisaldab võrdlusanalüüsi  teoreetilisi sisendite 
kohta. Lõputöö tugineb peamiselt dokumentide analüüsil, ametlikest kanalitest pärineval 
sekundaarselt statistilisel infol, poolstruktureeritud intervjuudel ja juhtumikirjeldusel, mis 
annab tööle praktilise kaalutluse. Käesolev magistritöö on kirjutatud inglise keeles, 
koosneb 56 leheküljest, 22 näidetest ja 26 tabelitest. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Kriitiline Informatsiooni Infrastruktuur, Kriitiline Infrastruktuur, Kriitilisuse Kriteerium, 
Cyberist Sõltumus, Ahel Ebaõnne, Informatsiooni ja Kommunikatsiooni Tehnoloogia. 
CERCS: P170 Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine 
(automaatjuhtimisteooria) 
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1 Introduction	
1.1 Motivation	
Future societies depend on the provision of essential services such as electricity, web 
services, airport operations, etc. These services are often interconnected with each other 
and rely on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), termed as cyber 
dependence. Cyber dependence is fundamental for the proper functioning of Critical 
Infrastructure (CI). Dependence may be described as: “the situation in which you need 
something or someone all the time, especially in order to continue existing or operating”1. 
Therefore, interdependence is the mutual or bidirectional dependence on each other. 
Indeed, the connectivity among CIs is classified into four main types of interdependencies: 
physical, geographic, cyber and logical; and these interdependencies could be disrupted by 
failures, termed as: escalating, cascading, and common cause [1]. 
The protection of communication networks has been studied for many years by 
organizations and professionals in information security. The studies have occurred to 
prevent and mitigate the impact of cyber attacks. If a network is compromised by 
malware, this tends to lead to the spread of further viruses [2], which once spread is very 
difficult to stop. This can happen because electronic devices are vulnerable to malware 
attacks; common human errors such as system misconfiguration or disclosure of classified 
information [3]; increase disruption to the systems and, the growing interconnectivity that 
facilitates the propagation of these [4]. 
Researchers have shown that cyber dependence not only brings benefits like information 
sharing, but also increases the probability of disruptions, that could impact people’s lives, 
the economy of countries, and its essential services supply [5]. Therefore, the 
identification of CII services is the first step in the process to protect the interests of 
communities who depend upon services such as these.  
Some countries have developed their own methodology for the identification of CII 
services; methods are required to be as precise as possible in determining what must be 
protected [6]. In Estonia, for example, the definition speaks of vital services instead of 
critical sectors, with more than 40 vital services and 160 providers identified2; Italy has 
identified only two critical sectors: energy and transportation [7]; France used the 
“Operator-based” approach to identify 12 critical sectors, 21 subsectors and 220 vital 
operators; Switzerland used a “Service-oriented” approach to identify 10 critical sectors 
and 28 sub-sectors; and, The United Kingdom uses the “Asset-based” that is a hybrid 
between the “Service-based” and the “Operated-based” approaches [5]. 
1.2 Problem	statement	
Although the existence of standardization efforts and organizations devoted to the 
identification and protection of CII services exist in the European Union. Members do not 
apply the same approaches and frameworks. Strategies differ and regulations are based on 
specific factors as the culture, geography, habits, particular hazards, religion, priorities and 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, the individual approaches members have used for the 
identification of the CII services, has led governments to allocate resources and rationalize 
efforts to increase their cyber security capacity. One such program is the CII protection 
plan that contains resource allocation and policies for the prevention and mitigation of 
                                                
1 Cambridge dictionaries online. Viewed on 02-Jan-16. Retrieved from http://dictionary.cambridge.org  
2 Retrieved by personal interview (2015, December 15). Interviewer Code: ID_9 
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unauthorized access to information; and, modification or destruction of software that is 
required by the CI to work properly [8]. 
Countries such as Colombia that have not yet defined CI categories [9], would benefit 
from the development of a comprehensive instrument that could be used to gather the 
information from public and private operators. Comprehensive may be understood as: 
including everything that could be necessary3. Otherwise, to take one or part of these 
existing methodologies from industrialized nations that have not the same economy, 
resources: human, time and technical, or sectors, like: space and research, chemical and 
nuclear industry, etc., and apply to a country such as Colombia, would not be appropriate 
or suitable for protecting their essential services. 
In 2014, Cyber Security Technical Assistance Mission (CSTAM) developed a meeting 
with more than 20 experts in cyber security from different countries in order to analyse of 
the status of cyber security. It was established and affirmed that Colombia has not defined 
what its critical infrastructure is, as yet, and therefore is unable to define what to protect 
[9]. However, one year later, in 2015 the OAS released a report with dangerous 
information of the current state of cyber security, in which was affirmed that cyber threats 
in Colombia are growing and a great amount of phishing, computer hijacking, identity 
theft, among them, running in Latin America is executed from this country [10]. These 
statements corroborate that Colombia, at least, needs to define and identify their CI and 
essential services in order to develop a protection plan to enhance their cyber security. 
The following example illustrates the importance of CII services in Colombia and the 
possible consequences caused by a cyber attack on one of their essential services. The 
aeronautical agency reported that in 2014 the domestic aviation carried a total of 
36,134,568 passengers4. That means if someone executes a cyber attack against the air 
navigation services, this would stop all air traffic, and the malfunction would significantly 
affect the population in Colombia. In addition, cyber dependence could disturb other vital 
services as airports operation, meteorological monitoring, food distribution, etc. 
1.3 Main	goal	
In order to support countries as Colombia that have not yet identified their essential 
services, this thesis aims to develop a comprehensive instrument for identifying CII 
services and offers a common ground in terminology that facilitates the communication 
between government and the public/private sectors. As well, it illustrates a proposed 
framework that describes the flow of information among principal stakeholders, which are 
proposed as a result of a literature review. Framework is understood as “a system of rules, 
ideas, or beliefs that is used to plan or decide something” 5. 
Research Question: How to develop a comprehensive instrument for identifying critical 
information infrastructure services? 
Research Tasks: 
1) Based on research papers and secondary statistical data to establish the national 
stakeholders for the CII that facilitates the communication among them; 
2) To analyse existing guidelines and gathered information from expert to establish 
the criticality criteria for the identification of CII services; 
                                                
3 Cambridge dictionaries online. Op. cit. 
4 Aeronautical Civil. (2014). Operational statistics of the Colombian aviation. Viewed on 02-Feb-16. Retrieved from 
http://goo.gl/04BzEm  
5 Cambridge dictionaries online. Op. cit. 
11 
 
3) To illustrate a proposed framework that describes the flow of information between 
stakeholders for the identification of critical services. 
1.4 Scope	
This instrument does not intend to display a list of CII services of any country. On the 
contrary, this research offers an alternative instrument that could be used for collecting 
relevant information to identify those essential services that its core activity relies on ICT. 
Although, this work is based on secondary statistical data of Colombia in order to 
exemplify a particular case and to pinpoint some generic criticality criteria, it is available 
for governments and stakeholders that have not yet identified their CII services.  
1.5 Research	design	
This work includes a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, applying 
throughout the following methods: document analysis (qualitative) for collection and 
analysis of research and academic papers, public documents and existing 
guidelines/methodologies as contributions to identify CII services. Semi-structured 
Interviews are presented (qualitative) to understand the vision and plot an overview that 
draws from the expertise of professionals in the field (there are 17 experts whose 
interviews represent a specific and accurate knowledge base in CII). Secondary statistical 
data from official sources (quantitative) are examined and presented with pre-existing 
numerical data that contributes to answer the research question and determine the 
relationships and specific factors among Internet users, financial resources, cyber attacks 
data, etc., [11]. As a result of the analysis, this instrument establishes an alternative 
definition about CII services, a generic criticality criteria and a proposed illustration that 
describes the flow of information between principal stakeholders, using secondary 
statistical data from the country of Colombia. 
1.6 Thesis	structure	
This work includes five main chapters. As is displayed below: 
The fists part consists of background information, which explores and examines more than 
20 research papers and guideline manuals released by countries such as The United States, 
Germany, France and Estonia. These countries had already identified their essential 
services and also held an accurate protection plan. This chapter shows the importance of 
essential services for society and how communication networks have become a top 
priority for governments and organizations. 
The second part focuses on the identification of stakeholders, which could help 
governments to design roles in national policies and guidelines that would allow for the 
distribution of tasks and also to strategize efforts to identify CII services. It is classified in 
three layers:  
1) National decision makers; 
2) Strategic operators; 
3) Collaborating institutions. 
Although, criticality criteria could be a political decision in most countries, their 
applicability includes academic, administrative and technical issue. For that reason, the 
third part suggests a procedure for the enumeration of the table of protection priorities. 
Criticality criteria can be calculated by two influences: importance and risk, which is the 
result of crossing threat, vulnerability and consequence [12]. Based on the expertise of 17 
professionals in the field and guidelines released by countries as The United States and 
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European Union, the following criticality criteria and factors are established as a generic 
list:  
Criteria 
1) Public health and safety impact; 
2) Economy impact; 
3) Psychological impact; 
4) Political/Governance impact; 
5) Dependence impact. 
Factors 
1) Effects of time; 
2) Magnitude; 
3) Scope distribution.  
The fourth part is by using the 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK framework, which can collect 
data from principal stakeholders, this is an illustrating flow of information that contains 
eight specific steps, and these are: 
1) Set goals and policies; 
2) Identify CII operators; 
3) Establish criticality criteria; 
4) Apply a BIA and risk assessment; 
5) Identify CII services; 
6) Report continuity plan; 
7) Identify cyber dependencies; 
8) List CII services, operators and sectors. 
This framework is viable and can be possible, because once the CII services are identified; 
each essential service contains the path travelled during the process, such as: CII service, 
operator, subsector and sector, and on-going interaction among the main stakeholders; in 
order to keep continues communication that allows exchanging information and resources. 
The last part of this research called as the case study of Colombia, it is based on some 
secondary statistical information of Colombia; the case’s description represents the 
analysis of behaviour of potential CII services. Nonetheless, this illustration does not 
pretend to display a real list of Colombia' CII services because the criticality criteria 
ranking does not belong to the state's characteristics. On the contrary, this hypothetical 
scenario is used to exemplify the relationship between two essential services and map the 
likely position of them in the table of national protection priorities. 
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2 Background	
Information System (IS) research is a discipline that includes qualitative and quantitative 
methods, this approach explains the relationship between people and social aspects within 
an organization as a system, and how it is supported by the use of computer technology 
[13] [14]. In other words, this discipline could be considered as a link between society and 
information and communication networks. On the one hand, information can be as 
important as other business assets, and communication networks have become a top 
priority for organizations because these not only have to offer access information 24 hours 
a day to users, but also the use of this can reduce operating costs, transaction time and 
overheads [15]; turning it into an attractive target for cyber attackers. As a result, 
organizations have to ensure that their information is protected against people who do not 
have the right to access specific data [8]. On the other hand, society depends increasingly 
on the national Critical Infrastructure (CI) that offers essential services as water 
distribution, web services, bus services, etc., which are obliged to support the government 
in providing a high quality and a readily available system of services. Actually, in the past 
few years’ organizations have purposefully increased interconnection between CIs to share 
resources and efforts [7]. 
Therefore, economy and society depend on the proper functionality of CIs [16]; these 
infrastructures are interdependent, which implies that the state of one can directly 
influence others [1][17][18]. There are 4 types of interconnection among infrastructures; 
however, these interdependencies are not necessarily mutually exclusive, these are [1][18]:  
1) Cyber interdependence: of which the core activity is based on the proper 
functioning of information and communication networks; 
2) Physical interdependence: where two or more infrastructures are physically 
interdependent if a product produced by an infrastructure (output) is strictly 
necessary by another infrastructure for it to operate properly (input); 
3) Geographical interdependence: this occurs when physical components of one or 
more infrastructures are sharing a spatial proximity, this type of interdependence is 
mainly affected by physical damage such as terrorism or natural disasters; 
4) Logical interdependence: where two or more infrastructures are logically 
interdependent if the state of each infrastructure depends on the state of the other 
through a different mechanism to the above interdependencies. An example of 
logical interdependence is when airfare to a specific city is a discount; this allows 
more people to travel to that destination and the hotel sector increase its reserves. 
In this case, the interdependence is due to human actions and is not the result of a 
physical, geographic or cyber interdependence.  
In 2008, research surrounding 4 types of interdependencies showed that 
telecommunications and electricity are the most important infrastructures that support 
infrastructure interdependence. Furthermore research indicated, “critical infrastructures 
face a twofold threat from both technical and social vulnerabilities” [4]. In support of this, 
Estonia is much more accurate to say that their vital services are based on three pillars: 
communication, data processing and energy; 90% of its services are dependent on 
information technologies; which means that if there is an interruption of IT, the service is 
also greatly affected6. This clearly illustrates the strong influence of electricity and the 
                                                
6 Director General of the Estonian Information System’s Authority. (2013). Viewed on 18-Mar-16. Retrieved from 
https://goo.gl/S0yqZ9  
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Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on the proper functioning of society. 
As described in the following table: 
Table 1. List of CI sectors and definitions established by some countries 
 Definition of CI Total of sectors 
T
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 “Assets, systems, and networks, 
whether physical or virtual, are 
considered so vital to the United States 
that their incapacitation or destruction 
would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any 
combination thereof” [19][20][21]. 
Financial services; chemical; 
communication; commercial facilities; 
dams; emergency services; critical 
manufacturing, defence industrial base; 
healthcare and public health; energy; 
government facilities; information 
technology; transportation; food and 
agriculture; nuclear reactors, materials 
and waste; and, water and wastewater 
systems. Total: 16 CI sectors 
E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
 
“An asset, system or part thereof 
located in Member States which is 
essential for the maintenance of vital 
societal functions, health, safety, 
security, economic or social well-being 
of people, and the disruption or 
destruction of which would have a 
significant impact in a Member State as 
a result of the failure to maintain those 
functions” [19][22][23]. 
Energy; Information, Communication 
Technologies; Water; Food; Health; 
Financial; Public & Legal Order and 
Safety; Civil Administration; Transport; 
Chemical and Nuclear Industry; Space 
and Research. Total: 11 CI sectors 
G
er
m
an
y 
“CIs are organizational and physical 
structures and facilities of such vital 
importance to a nation's society and 
economy that their failure or 
degradation would result in sustained 
supply shortages, significant disruption 
of public safety and security, or other 
dramatic consequences” [24]. 
Energy; information technology and 
telecommunication; transport; health; 
water; food; financial and insurance; 
state and administration; and, media and 
culture. Total: 9 CI sectors 
In order to understand the relationship between CI sectors and CII services, and avoid 
overlap in these terms, this chapter explains each definition separately. 
Although, some of the above examples refer to sectors as energy, transport, water, food, 
etc., which provide the essential services that support modern information societies and 
economies; the difference between these countries is that the United States has 7 CI 
sectors more than Germany, which corroborates that not only the definition cannot be 
universally applied in the same way and that there is no universally recognized meaning of 
what CI is, but also their approaches and interests are differ according to region. 
Consequently, CII is part of the organizations that are based on the correct operation of 
ICT, which leads to a correct functioning of society [7]. Protecting the entire networks has 
always been problematic and unreachable. These factors make it more difficult to know 
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how and what must be protected. In order to understand the definition of CII, three 
questions need to be examined:  
1) What should be termed as critical?  
2) What does the information mean in this context?  
3) What does the infrastructure mean? 
Firstly, critical should be understood as: “Of the greatest importance to the way things 
might happen”7. However, it can be also be defined as an essential contribution to society 
in order to have a minimum quality level of international and national law; economy; 
public health and safety; and, ecological environment [25]. From the previous statements 
critical could be understood as a large number of factors that contribute to the lives of 
people, the economy of a whole country; that is one of the reasons why organizations 
devoted to the identification and protection of CII services apply the criticality criteria to 
their services, which can be widely organized by critical proportion, critical time and 
critical quality [12]. 
Secondly, although some research and public papers related to CII did not define or arrive 
at a universal criterion for CII, it is accepted that communication networks have a vital 
role to play. For example, professor Nickolov says that communication technologies are 
stimulating globalization, and improve the efficiency, productivity and competitiveness of 
the organizations [8]. Guidelines released by the organization ENISA, state that 
communication networks are a meaningful part of the lives of European citizens, and they 
symbolize the fabric of the future information [7].  
There are other definitions in published documents that explain what an Information 
System may also be. To be as precise as possible, it was defined as interrelated systems 
working together to collect, process and store data to help to analysis, decision-making 
and visualizations of organizations [26]. Similarly defining the Information System as 
computer-based systems, which are combined of software, hardware and 
telecommunications networks to collect, create and distribute useful information [27]; and, 
in 2014, one researcher specified that an Information System is the vital component that 
produces information which may be perceived as five main factors: software, hardware, 
data, people and procedures [28]. According to these definitions and under the CI’s 
context, the word information is related with communication networks that could be 
constituted as a combination of the telecommunication, hardware and software in order to 
storing/processing/exchange data along network links, which may be subject to risks that 
may have unfavourable consequences on the functioning of the organization by 
compromising the availability, confidentiality, or integrity of information. 
Thirdly, infrastructure is defined as “the basic systems and services, such as transport and 
power supplies, that a country or organization uses in order to work effectively”8, the 
Oxford dictionaries online defines this as “The basic physical and organizational 
structures and facilities, e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies; needed for the operation of 
a society or enterprise, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, 
post offices, and prisons”9. These terms support the definition in the field of CI, both the 
Professor Wilde and Rinaldi based their researches on the definition established by the 
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) [1][18][21]. 
                                                
7 Cambridge dictionaries online. Op. cit. 
8 Cambridge dictionaries online. Op. cit. 
9 Oxford dictionaries online. Viewed on 02-Jan-16. Retrieved from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com  
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Nonetheless, the professor Tabansky has stated that infrastructure is a system with several 
facilities to carry out activities and argues that it would be considered critical when the 
disruption causes a significant socio-economic crisis; three factors can define an 
infrastructure as critical [16]: 
1) The symbolic importance in the country, such as museums and monuments; 
2) The direct dependence on infrastructures like energy and telecommunication 
networks; 
3) The interconnectivity among other infrastructures that could cause cascading 
failures. 
Understanding the definitions of CI and CII are often still unclear [29], and some research 
papers have a lack of clarity about the relationship between them, which is illustrated in 
the following statements: In Italy the Protecting National Critical Infrastructure from 
Cyber Threats – TENACE project makes a distinction between cyber and physical CI, 
classified as physical a wide range of facilities and system: energy, transportation, etc.; 
and, cyber as intangible and tied to information technology: financial services, e-
government, etc. [30].  
In addition, professor Wilde matched with the TENACE project, which argues that the 
cyber infrastructure is as important as physical infrastructure [18]. Quite the opposite, 
Estonia says of the CIIs are a part of the CI, even though their definition speaks of vital 
services instead of CI sectors10. And, in contrast, Lithuania defined it, as: “Critical 
information infrastructure shall mean an electronic communications network, information 
system or a group of information systems where an incident that occurs causes or may 
cause grave damage to national security, national economy or social wellbeing” [31]. 
As a result of the above definitions, CII is considered as a part of national CI and 
sequentially society; but it should be analysed as a whole system in order to avoid 
misunderstandings with their definitions and applicability. As shown in the following 
figure:  
 
Figure 1. Critical Information Infrastructure as a system. 
Continuing the concept of CII services, there are different methodological approaches that 
are used by European Union members. In 2014, ENISA released a methodology for the 
identification of CII assets and services based on collected information from some 
member states, that paper provided a list of 11 CI sectors and highlighted that not all 
sectors are important for all country. ENISA identified two approaches: 
                                                
10 Republic of Estonia – Information System Authority. Viewed on 05-Feb-16. Retrieved from 
https://www.ria.ee/en/ciip.html  
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Firstly, a non-critical service dependent approach: Network architecture analysis, which is 
a methodology that is not used by any country in Europe, but that private companies use to 
map their networks. This approach includes: 
1) “The analysis of the IP and data network, the traffic load patterns, and failure 
patterns” [7]; 
2)  “The identification of components, which are critical to the operation of the 
overall network or a major part of the network” [7]. 
This approach identifies the core network and some additional components of an 
organization that support most of the data traffic to generate a global map. However, one 
disadvantage is that both the public and private sectors must design a complete map of the 
network architecture and ignore critical services, which are interconnected through ICTs, 
because it is based specifically on the network infrastructure as a whole. And, another 
disadvantage is that the analysis of a large map of infrastructure may neglect to include 
components that are at lower levels, but could also be considered as critical. 
Secondly, a Critical Service (CS)-dependent approach, as is present in this methodology, 
ENISA included 3 main steps to work with, and these are:  
1) Identification of the critical sector, in this step, member states have already 
identified a list of CI sectors. Nonetheless, if another country outside the European 
Union wanted to use this methodology, it could not fully apply the criterion as this 
step was omitted; 
2) Identification of critical services, is divided into two sub-approaches, each depends 
on who is responsible for identifying critical services:  
a. The state-driven approach or critical service-driven, where the responsibility is 
taken by government agencies, who is responsible for identifying the critical 
sectors and the list of essential services, which are found by applying criticality 
criteria. Then, the government selects the operators that are responsible for 
providing these essential services; 
b. The operator-driven approach or vital operator, in this approach, government is 
also responsible for identifying the CI sectors. Then, they select a list of 
operators instead of essential services, who are responsible to identify CII assets 
and services. Each sub-approach has advantages and disadvantages [7], which 
are shown in the following table. 
Table 2. Contrast of sub approaches described by ENISA. 
 The state-driven approach The operator-driven approach 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
1. The government approves and audits the CII 
protection plans per each service, which can 
ensure a comprehensive plan; 
2. The government is directly responsible for 
the national economy and welfare of its 
people. The government have overall control 
of the protection of CII services ensures these 
factors; 
3. The list of criticality criteria is focused on 
national interests. 
1. The government approves and audits 
the CII protection plans per each 
service, which can ensure a 
comprehensive plan; 
2. The operators can establish the cyber 
interdependencies between their 
institutional CI services; 
3. The operator has resources that to 
locate and identify their critical 
services. 
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D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
1. The government has to allocate adequate 
resources (human, financial and time) for 
accomplishing the final purpose; 
2. If the list of essential services is not selected 
properly, it could disfigure the real interests of 
society; 
3. The government uniquely responsible for 
the identification of CI sector and CII services. 
Operators do not participate in this process and 
their responsibilities are aimed at establishing 
a CII protection plan and deploying said plan; 
4. There is no coordination among CI sectors. 
Therefore, the cyber interdependencies could 
be established incorrectly. 
1. The government represented by each 
ministry decides whether the operator 
is part of CI sector; 
2. Criticality criteria can focus on 
needs of the business’ operator instead 
of countries national interests; 
3. The operator is the sole decider of 
what services will be part of the CII; 
4. It is a non-homogeneous deployment 
of the identification of CII services, 
and the meaning of essential services 
could be confused.  
The last step in this process is the identification of critical information infrastructure 
network assets and services supporting critical services. The CII services and assets are 
supported by some criticality criteria. This classification represents the final phase of that 
methodology, where each operator establishes the respective protection plan for each 
service.  
Regardless of the approach, ENISA argues that success would be to establish good 
communication and cooperation among stakeholders involved in the operations of CII 
services. Researchers go beyond this, adding that success must also include factors like 
transparency in national systems, social and industrial awareness, public-private 
cooperation and well-defined job distribution [15]. Nonetheless, ENISA catalogued the 
task responsibly, and stated they are: operators of CI and network operators (electronic 
communication providers, national telecommunication regulator and cyber-security 
agencies). Other research reference participatory factors at 3 levels: technological, 
operational, and national-strategic [16].  
In addition, the correct knowledge distribution is vital. This is a factor that involves CI, 
stakeholders and the decision makers at all levels, key is the relationship among them, 
which can protect or damage dependent on methods of knowledge sharing and 
distribution. Both professor Rinaldi and Tabansky classified these types of failure, as 
[1][16]:  
1) A common cause failure by earthquakes, floods and fires; this failure is not related 
with cyber interdependence, however it could affect the normal behaviour because 
a single incident can damage others services; 
2) A cascading failure: this is a good example of the result of a successful cyber 
attack, because the disruption of one service could cause the failure in other 
services even if they have no directly cyber dependence [32]. In fact, a real 
modelling could be demonstrated that “a failure of one node in a network may lead 
to a cascade of failures in the entire system”, this was a result of simulation of the 
real geographical locations, using real-world data from a power network, the case 
of Italy [33]; 
3) An escalating failure: this is related to time and severity, which can rapidly 
increase the damage and recovery becomes more complex if it is not stopped on 
time [16][34]. 
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Appropriately, in order to prevent and mitigate those failures, industrialized countries have 
employed criticality criteria to establish a range of infrastructures to classify protection 
priorities [35]. Although, there is a group of criteria typically used to evaluate the impact 
of social vulnerability, economic damage assessments, capabilities and resilience studies; 
the definition of terms like resiliencies, risks, vulnerabilities and criticality are still not 
100% clear [12][32].  
On the one hand, some research papers propose a combination of the Business Impact 
Analysis (BIA) and risks assessment in order to understand more broadly the correlation 
of the essential services and potential threats, vulnerabilities and consequences [36]. The 
main task of BIA is to identify the important essential services and to understand the 
impact and effect the disruption or failures of these processes have on a company [37]. 
Actually, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined it, as: “The 
BIA purpose is to correlate specific system components with the critical services that they 
provide, and based on that information, to characterize the consequences of a disruption 
to the system components” [38]. 
On the other hand, professors Theoharidou, Kotzanikolaou and Gritzalis think that the lack 
of clarity is to define the correlation between “the protection of CIs and the mitigation of 
security risks faced by CIs” [35]. Nevertheless, some researchers and interviewees suggest 
that criteria could be summarised in “how serious is serious” and the criteria could be 
based on the major detrimental impact on economic, social consequences and to loss of 
life [10][15]. In 2014, ENISA suggested criticality criteria on: populations affected; 
concentration; economic impact; international relations; public order; public confidence; 
and, public operations hindered and how 3rd party MS services are affected. On the other 
hand, the United States catalogues the criticality criteria on: economic, public health and 
safety, psychological, and governance/mission11. 
2.1 Conclusion	
The identification of CII services play a meaningful role for the welfare of people as it 
allows the governments to identify what essential services and cyber dependencies must 
be protected [6]. For that reason, countries like The United States, Germany, France, 
Estonia, among others, have already identified these essential services and have an 
accurate protection plan that includes the detailed description of specific relevant 
elements. Nonetheless, these countries not only do not share the same definitions or an 
agreed universal criterion, and their approaches and interests differ, this is primarily 
because of states do not have the same economy, resources and/or sectors; which 
influences significantly in the direct dependencies on other infrastructures and people’s 
lives. Each country is unique and thus its needs are not equal. 
Independently and separate from existing criticality criteria (based on population, 
economic, interdependence, international relations, defence, public order, etc.), CII 
services could be mapped via the impacts which could then be calculated based on 3 
universal characteristics [12][35]: 
1) Scope distribution: the geographic area that could be affected by the unavailability 
of a specific CI; 
2) Magnitude: the effects of gravity are caused by the interruption of a particular CI; 
3) Effects of time: it is represented in hours, days, months and years, which is the 
point that the loss of an element could have a grave impact. 
                                                
11 National Infrastructure Protection Plan. (2009). The United States. Viewed on 10-Feb-16. Retrieved from 
https://goo.gl/4oOb6a 
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3 Main	Stakeholders	
Due to the lack of clarity in published research papers, and no universally accepted 
solution for the identification of CII services [7][29] as discussed in the previous chapter it 
is important to define what we understand as CII. To identify the national stakeholders and 
define an accurate terminology for establishing a common understanding of the terms of 
CII is one the bases to distribute tasks, transmit feedback in order to avoid unnecessary 
efforts. Therefore, this chapter proposes a helpful definition that facilitates the 
communication among principal stakeholders. 
3.1 National	stakeholders	
First of all, a global description of the national stakeholders involved in the identification 
of CII services lead to define precisely the minimum terminology that could be used for 
this purpose. In order to offer an alternative methodology, this section hierarchically 
organises the national stakeholders to make it easier to interpret and to avoid unnecessary 
confusion and effort, which has been the result of existing approaches like operator-base 
and service-based; research papers; as seen in contributions made by interviewees; and, 
guidelines released by ENISA, NIST, and the OAS. 
The national stakeholders are proposed into 3 types of layers:  
1) National decision makers are the leaders responsible for the determination of CII 
operators based on all sectors, such as regulatory bodies, advisory agencies, and/or 
delegates from each ministry. As well, it could be supported by the national CERT; 
2) Strategic operators are responsible for operating and identifying the specific CII 
services that meet with the criticality criteria established by the national decision 
makers. In addition, operators must identify the vulnerabilities and risk of their 
assets and systems, and report periodically to national decision makers the impact 
and the probability of the occurrence of these threats [39]; 
3) Collaborating institutions are responsible for analysing cyber dependencies among 
CII services; to be a coordinator between operators; and, carry out researches and 
developments to review periodically the identification of new CII services, such as 
CERTs, organizations devoted to released guidelines for protecting CII (I.e. 
ENISA, OAS, etc.), and universities that contain professionals in information 
security, laboratories and financial resources for research. 
 
Figure 2. The national stakeholders for the identification of CII services. 
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First, national decision makers tend to follow global steps based on the operator approach 
by France, where the state is responsible for identifying CII operators, but the 
methodology for carrying out their tasks are different, especially the way how operators 
are enumerated. To describe this process, government is represented by ministries or 
whoever takes responsibility for this role. They are responsible for identifying CII 
operators based on statistical data generated by public and private organizations; like loss 
of human life, users of Internet, financial resources and cyber attacks data; ensuring that 
all essential services are taken into account, regardless if they belong or not to CI sector; 
under the concept described in the previous chapter, where CII is considered as a complete 
system. This differs from the Switzerland’s approach, whereby the government is 
responsible to establish criticality criteria to encourage each operator to use a non-
homogeneous deployment as criteria, and to preserve the national interest in order for it to 
prevail over business interest. Business is understood as any collective private activities 
that humans carry out to generate value [28][40]. The national decision makers could be 
supported by the national CERT and composed of regulatory bodies, and/ or delegates 
from each ministry and advisory agencies. 
These responsibilities are assigned to national decision makers layer, because of: 
1) Countries as The United States, England and Germany consider that most of the 
cyber attacks against public and private sectors are demarcated as criminal acts and 
espionage [41][42]. In other words, these cyber attacks are performed against the 
interests of the state; 
2) Government is solely responsible for establishing guidelines and policies for the 
identification and protection of national CII not only because it is part of national 
security measures [15][41], but also the suitable functioning affects all areas of 
citizens’ life [1][16]; 
3) The principal objective of a national CERT is to protect economic security and the 
ability of CI [43]. In the case of Colombia, the responsibility for identifying the 
country’s CI was assigned to Colombia’s CERT [10]. 
Second, strategic operators are represented by each provider from all public-private 
sectors [43], whose main objective is to identify the specific CII services related to generic 
criticality criteria established by using its own security framework, or a combination of 
business impact analysis and risk assessment, because: 
1) The operators can establish cyber dependencies between their organizational CI 
services [7]. This process can reveal in their strengths and limitations as an 
interconnected network; 
2) Organizations focus on service delivery and know their internal processes [1], 
which allows description and identification of essential services faster than other 
external agency. Actually, in countries such as The United States, 85% of CI is 
owned by the private sector [18]. In Germany almost 90% of national CI’s are in 
the hands of private companies [15]. In the case of Latin American, 80% of the CI 
that administers essential services is operated by the private sector [10]; 
3) Private companies may be reluctant to share their proprietary data, databases and 
physical files [1]. Although, each operator is able to access to the source, they do 
not need to report detailed risk assessment to national decision makers; a 
comprehensive business continuity plan of high level is enough; 
4) In 2014, a study carried out by Symantec Lab12 showed that in Latin American the 
cyber attacks caused the loss on average of US$2 million per private company. 
                                                
12 CONPES document. (2011). Republic of Colombia. P. 7. Viewed on 10-Feb-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/a3ZrrC  
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Therefore, the private sector may offer special expertise and allocate technological 
and financial resources to protect their services against cyber attacks [7]. 
Operators must generate a business continuity plan and focused treatment plans of 
essential services during and after interruptions, to be analysed by the national CERT and 
collaborating institutions in order to classify potential threats and vulnerabilities These 
plans also calculate the impact of these occurrences on society and other essential services 
[39]. 
Third, collaborating institutions: The existing organizations devoted to enhancing the 
protection of CII’s are important parts of the identification of CII services; they can 
facilitate the coordination and communication among organizations (CII operators). 
ENISA in Europe release reports and guidelines that emphasise good practices, that 
protect CII services and help raising awareness on related cyber security challenges. 
Similarly, the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission represents the OAS, 
whose main objective is to facilitate and promote the continuous development of ICT. To 
illustrate this point, in Colombia almost 17 million of users have Internet access13, this 
methodology proposes that Internet service providers and telecommunication network 
operators are perceived as collaborating institutions because these qualify as one of the 
best options to identify and subsequently handle a cyber attack.  
On the other hand, universities could advise on the functionality of the national CERT, 
because it could improve technical competence without investing too much in terms of 
resource. Supported by the following arguments: 
1) The CERT could be responsible to identify and monitor incidents that affect the 
national CII, including their essential services [43]. Academic university networks 
could carry out technical research projects in an efficient and specialised manner 
[6]; 
2) Due to malware it is difficult to detect/stop threats when there is interconnectivity 
with other systems [4]. University researchers, professors, and students could be 
trained to handle complex research methods to identify threats in the field of ICT 
[6]; 
In the case of Colombia, universities are highly valued; two universities are rated 
academically on the list of 300 best in the world14. These universities would be best placed 
to adequately implement research projects. This ranking is based on indicators such as 
reputation among the global academic community, its research impact, number of research 
projects, etc. 
3.2 Critical	Information	Infrastructure	Services	
Each country establishes their own definition of CII depending on the national needs [15]. 
The following figure illustrates a clear conception of what CII is and their associated 
services in this research paper, which is a combination of the definitions of Estonia and 
Lithuania, and Rinaldi’s research paper [1]. Accordingly, CII services are described in this 
work as: the essential services that belong to the CI and its core processes depend on ICT, 
which may be interconnected with each other; called: cyber dependent; and that a 
disruption so such services would inevitably affects other services.  
                                                
13 Ministry of Telecommunications. (2015). Statistical data of Colombia. Viewed on 08-Mar-16. Retrieved from 
http://goo.gl/SCtW6D 
14 QS Top Universities. (2016). Viewed on 15-Mar-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/mmIACv  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the relationship among society, CI and CII services. 
Illustrated in fig. 3, the yellow circles represent CII services and the red arrows are the 
possible cyber dependencies; these yellow nodes could have cyber direct, indirect or inter 
dependences with local and/or external essential services. 
To exemplify this point, the aviation system (airplanes, airports, control towers, etc.) is 
considered as CI in the United States, Italy, Germany and England; then, services like 
meteorological monitoring and air navigation are also considered CII services, because 
their core activities depend exclusively on the ICT [15]. 
3.3 Cascading	failure	
Some studies have demonstrated the catastrophic effects recursively that can cause 
interconnected infrastructures, where the failure of one service may cause disruption in 
other services [44][33]. Even if the probability of occurrence is low, the result of this may 
be devastating to multiples services, and may cause a cascade of systems failures [45]; this 
was based on the study conducted by Havlin in Italy, who explained that an initial failure 
in an electricity generating plant can cause cascading effects in a large network turning it 
into fragmented networks [33]. One such example is Colombia. In Colombia there are 
more than 80 electrical substation plants throughout the country, and these are 
interconnected with each other, the following figure illustrates an imaginary cascade of 
failures on some nodes called “D”, which are dependent on its predecessor. 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of a cascading failure, the case of Colombia. 
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3.4 Cyber	dependence	
The dependence is understood as a connection among infrastructures, where one service is 
directly correlated to the state or for the generation of the other services [1][17][18]. The 
cyber dependence may help to identify services as critical because their connections can 
demonstrate that one service in whatever kind of relationship such as direct, indirect or 
interdependence may cause disruption or failures on others by its cascading effects [7].  
 
Figure 5. Example of types of relationship among CII services. 
As is shown in the figure above, the function of the node “C” depend directly on the 
function of node “B”; as well, indirectly on the function of the node “A”; and, it has a 
mutual relationship with node “D”.  Then, a cyber attack against node “A” could cause a 
disruption on the other three nodes. 
In Europe, dependence are classified in two levels [7][23]: 
1) National dependencies: this level includes intra-sector and cross-sector, it means 
that CII services that belong to specific CI sector can have a strong relationship 
among other essential services in the same sector (intra-sector), and/or among CI 
sectors, called cross-sector. One example is the influences that have the electricity 
and ICT on others other CI sectors; 
2) Cross-border dependencies: In 2015, the CCDCOE released a research paper in 
which clarified that disruption of an essential service outside the country can cause 
major damage to essential services within the country and vice versa, also the 
cascading effect can be extended to other countries, because of their cyber 
dependence and not the land borders [23]. 
To conclude, cyber interdependence could be defined as the relationship between CII 
services, where the states of them depend on the storing/processing/exchange of electronic 
data along network links. As shown below: 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of cyber interdependencies between some CII services. 
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4 Generic	Criticality	Criteria	for	a	Quick-Prioritize	
Information and communication technology (ICT) constitutes one of the most important 
elements of the CII services [4]. This element includes concepts such as vulnerability, 
threat and consequence that can be used to calculate the impact of ICT’s disruption 
[12][35]. As was clarified in the background chapter, many infrastructures are of 
importance, but can become critical factors when their disruption can significantly affect 
people’s lives, economy, etc., in other words, criticality is used to assess the impact level 
of essential services in countries if it suffers a disruption, by using the combination of two 
influences [12]: 
1) Importance: In the CII’s context is denoted the relevance of a service for a great 
percentage of society; 
2) Risk: It occurs when the service becomes a threat to the environment, i.e. by not 
provide water to the population anymore. 
According to the researchers the most common approach to catalogue an infrastructure as 
critical is through the use of comprehensive criticality criteria [7][12]. In fact, Estonia 
proposes seven criteria for the identification of their vital services15; these are: 
1) Number of benefit users; 
2) Frequency of use; 
3) Replacement timeframe; 
4) Dependence; 
5) Number of services with the same characteristics; 
6) Purpose; 
7) Timeframe of perceiving the consequences; and, influence on the life. 
However, the full protection of a service against cyber attacks is not possible, nor is it 
possible to prevent the cascading effect that once in flow is very difficult to stop [2]. 
Because of that, countries include dependence as criteria. The service itself is not only 
representative of a criticality for society, but also when that supports other essential 
services; the service in and of it could become critical. The table No. 3 shows a list of 
minimum criticality criteria used by some countries during the CI assessment. 
Table 3. Criteria established by some countries. 
Impact Criteria Country 
Public effect (number of population affected); 
Environmental effect; Economic effect; Political 
effects; Psychological effects; and, Public health 
consequences. 
The European Commission16 
(Directive of the Council, 2006) 
Public health and safety; economic; psychological; 
and, governance/mission impacts. 
The United States17 (National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
2009) 
                                                
15 Retrieved by personal interview (2016, March 8). Interviewer Code: ID_3 
16 The European Commission. (2006). Viewed on 10-Feb-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/wqNc3w 
17 National Infrastructure Protection Plan. (2009). The United States. Viewed on 10-Feb-16. Retrieved from 
https://goo.gl/4oOb6a 
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Although each country defines its own criteria, most of them have similar applicability so 
as to determine what to identify as critical [12]. This in turn allows a prioritization of the 
table of protection in order to allocate financial resources and efforts. 
4.1 Analysing	qualitative	interviews		
To understand the vision, interpret an overview and draw from the expertise of 
professionals on CII is one option for collecting new insights for the identification of 
generic criticality criteria [46]. The 17 people interviewed during this research represent 
the specialists and holders of expert knowledge in CII; actually, this was performed and 
distributed throughout 4 kinds of areas, the interviews were carried out by face-to-face (7 
of 15); skype* (8 of 15); telephone** (1 of 15); and, email*** (1 of 15). As shown in the 
following table: 
Table 4. List of interviewees (CO=Colombia; EE=Estonia; and, DE=Germany). 
Cod. Office Interviewed Academic 
Public 
Policy 
Technic
al Other 
IN_1 The Organization of American States *    X 
IN_2 Kaspersky Lab *   X  
IN_3 Ministry of Interior (EE)  X   
IN_4 AVIANCA airline (CO) **    X 
IN_5 Tallinn University of Technology X    
IN_6 Tallinn University of Technology X    
IN_7 University of Andes (CO)  * X    
IN_8 University of Andes (CO)  *** X    
IN_9 EE-CERT    X  
IN_10 EE-CERT    X  
IN_11 CO-CERT *   X  
IN_12 LV-CERT *   X  
IN_13 CCDCOE (EE)     X 
IN_14 CCDCOE (DE)    X 
IN_15 Direction of Public Safety and Infrastructure (CO) *  X   
IN_16 The National Department of Planning (CO)*  X   
IN_17 The National Department of Planning (CO)*  X   
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Most interviewees agreed the importance of assessing CII services to establish protection 
priorities, because governments can then allocate financial and technical resources, the 
interviewees responded to the question as follows:  
What criteria will you use to identify Critical Information Infrastructure services? 
Table 5. List of interviewees (I1=Interviewer 1; and, I2=Interviewer 2). 
Code Office Interviewed Economy Property 
Health 
and Safety 
Cyber 
Depende
nce 
Others 
IN_1 The Organization of American States X X   
IN_2 Kaspersky Lab X X X  
IN_3 Ministry of the Interior  X X X 
IN_4 AVIANCA airline  X X   
IN_5 Tallinn University of Technology – I1 X X   
IN_6 Tallinn University of Technology – I2 X X X X 
IN_7 University of Andes - I1 X X   
IN_8 University of Andes - I2 X X   
IN_9 EE-CERT – I1 X X  X 
IN_10 EE-CERT – I2  X   
IN_11 CO-CERT X X X  
IN_12 LV-CERT  X X   
IN_13 CCDCOE – I1 X X X  
IN_14 CCDCOE – I2 X X X X 
IN_15 Direction of Public Safety and Infrastructure  X X X  
IN_16 The National Department of Planning – I1 X X   
IN_17 The National Department of Planning – I2 X X  X 
As a result of the analysis by semi-structured qualitative interviews and due to the 
respondents belonging to organizations involved in academic researches, monitoring or 
identifying essential services in countries, such as: Latvia, Estonia, Colombia and 
Germany; the following criteria were mentioned to prioritize essential services, as shown 
below: 
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Figure 7. Primary statistical data gathered from interviews. 
The table above illustrates that 100% of the interviewees considered the impact of health 
and safety as the most important criteria for the prioritization of essential services in any 
country. This was followed by 88.24% of the interviewees, believing the economy played 
a meaningful role, and 41,17% of interviewees cited that cyber dependence could affect 
other essential services. 
Those criteria offers by interviewers could be combined with other criteria defined by 
countries such as: The United States and the European Union Members, whom have 
already identified their essential services. Even though, the final list may be influenced by 
political decisions, priorities, responsibilities and characteristic specific to each nation, this 
chapter proposes an adaptable matrix with a list of generic criticality criteria and factors, 
which are described in the next step. 
4.2 List	of	criteria	for	evaluating	of	CII	services	
In supporting criteria offered by interviewers and with information from countries 
belonging to the European Union, and The United States, the following table shows 
criteria that are similar and could be included in a generic list of criticality criteria. 
Table 6. Comparative list of criticality criteria. 
 
Although, the European Commission established their criteria in 2006 and The United 
States in 2009, in recent years new concepts related to CII have appeared, cyber 
dependence being one such concept (cross-sector and cross-border). To be as precise as 
possible, in 2015 the CCDCOE released the regulating cross-border dependencies of CII, 
in which it was demonstrated that very few countries consider dependence as a criteria; the 
100%	
88,24%	
41,17%	
29,41%	
Healt	and	Safety	 Economy	 CyberDependence	 Others	
29 
 
document also described almost all CII services of all countries are interconnected and that 
a disruption could affect other essential services; indeed, these criteria could have a trans 
boundary impact in neighbouring countries [29]. Then, based on some research papers and 
the vision and overview from the expertise of professionals on CII, this research has 
chosen to include cyber dependence as a criterion in order to offer an adjustable and 
updated matrix. Therefore, the following list is taken as generic criticality criteria in this 
work.  
1) Public health and safety impact; 
2) Economy impact; 
3) Psychological impact; 
4) Political/Governance impact; 
5) Dependence impact. 
In order to establish a common procedure, the impacts are evaluated with respect three 
factors [35][12]: 
1) Effects of time; 
2) Magnitude; 
3) Scope distribution.  
This list is designed in adaptable way, in order for stakeholders to add or delete a criterion 
vertically and/or a factor in order horizontal accordingly; thus it will not suffer changes in 
its procedure, because the calculation works as a matrix. Where the final result of that 
matrix would represent the position of each CII service in the table of protection priority. 
 
Figure 8. The adaptable matrix of criteria for evaluating CII services. 
All CII services listed should be evaluated as illustrated below. Nevertheless, each range 
of time, level of gravity and scope distribution can adapt their percentages or proportions 
depending on national needs and characteristics that each country is unique and thus its 
needs are not equal.  
First, the effect of time: it is represented in hours, which is the point that the loss of an 
element could have a grave impact on society. For example the impact an attack against 
the food distribution service could be reflected on society after some days or weeks, which 
could subsequently lead to food shortages in a given population. This factor is illustrated 
as: 
Table 7. Effect of time in hours. 
Range in hours More than 60 48 to 60 36 and 48 24 and 36 0 and 24 
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
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Second, the effect of magnitude is caused by the interruption of a particular CII service 
that can be estimated by using the following risk assessment matrix (Table No. 8), which 
was modified from Department of Defence Standard Practice of United States [47]. In 
addition, the description and range of values of severity categories (Catastrophic, Critical, 
Marginal and Negligible) and probability levels (Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote, 
Improbable) can be found in the official web site18. 
Table 8. Magnitude or level of impact took from MIL-STD-882E. 
 Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
Catastrophic 5 5 5 4 3 
Critical 5 5 4 3 3 
Marginal 4 4 3 3 3 
Negligible 3 3 2 2 1 
Third, scope distribution is the value that can be obtained by evaluating how a proportion 
of the population can be affected with respect to a service if it suffers a cyber attack. As 
shown below: 
Table 9. Population of people affected. 
Percentage/amount of population affected Value 
More than {insert maximum value} 5 
In the range of {insert value} 4 
In the range of {insert value} 3 
In the range of {insert value} 2 
In the range of {insert minimum value} 1 
Then, the value per each criterion is calculated by a mathematical operation called as Rn, 
where n is the number that represents each column, as shown below:   
 
Figure 9. Illustration for the evaluation of each criterion. 
                                                
18 Department of Defense Standard Practice. (2012). System Safety. The United States of America. Viewed on 12-Mar-
16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/2rgU48  
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Therefore, criticality ranking is estimated by a formula, this allows prioritizing each 
criterion that is represented by acronym “P” and “R” symbolises the result that was 
calculated in the previous figure, which represents the sum of the factors divided into the 
total number of them.  
 
Figure 10. Calculating process of all subsets. 
Next, to calculate the value of the sum of all subsets from (P1 x R1) to (Pn x Rn), where n 
represents the last number of the criteria; the following imaginary example could help 
understanding a deeper this procedure. For the country X, the priority is to mitigate the 
public health and safety impact, which symbolizes their nation’s characteristics. Therefore, 
to P1 will have assigned the highest value, which could be the total number of criteria, i.e. 
P1 = 5; and the other values will be assigned in descending order to other criticality 
criteria depending their importance. As illustrated below: 
1) Public health and safety impact; P1=5 
2) Economy impact;   P2=2 
3) Psychological impact;   P3=3 
4) Political/Governance impact;  P4=1 
5) Dependence impact.   P5=4 
In addition, if a country has two or more criterion with the same importance, these can 
have the same value of impact (I.e. P1 = P5 = Pn) for all of them.  
 
Figure 11. Illustrating process to calculate the value per criterion. 
As a result, the sum of all subsets indicates that the highest number will be the first CII 
service in the table of protection priorities. Other essential services and corresponding 
values are organized in descending order, leaving till last the smallest value. Moreover, the 
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multiplication inside of each subset (Pn x Rn) can help reducing the impact of a possible 
human error during data entry in the matrix because each subset is multiplied 
independently, as shown in fig.12; mitigating the rest of the formula suffers a strong 
influence.  
Subsequently regarding static testing, it became apparent that the final result could vary in 
the range of ±6.67 points in the table of national protection priorities depending on the 
value assigned to prioritizing each criterion “Pn”. To illustrate this point, assuming that if 
all fields of an adaptable matrix is filled with a value of 5, and the values of P1 to P5 are 
assigned in descending order as follows P1=5, P2=4, P3=3, P2=2, and P5=1; the final 
result will be 75 points. Otherwise, if a possible human error during data entry changed 
one of the public health impact’s values by 1 instead of 5, the result (the sum of all 
subsets) will be changed to 68.3 (6.67 points less than the first value calculated). 
 
Figure 12. Calculating process of criticality ranking for CII services. 
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5 An	Illustrative	Framework	for	Identifying	CII	services	
The identification of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) services depends on the 
ability of, and a good understanding between, public and private operators [48]. Therefore, 
the aim of this chapter is to propose an illustrative framework called as 360-DEGREE-
FEEDBACK that describes the flow of information among national decision makers, CII 
operators and collaborating institutions in order to identify of CII services based on eight 
steps, as seen in fig.13, these are:  
 
Figure 13. 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK framework for the identification of services. 
The 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK follows a step by step framework of the principal tasks 
carried out for identification of services, and on-going interaction among the main 
stakeholders; in order to keep a continues communication that allows exchanging 
information and resources. 
5.1 Set	goals	and	policies	
National decision makers are responsible for establishing the goals and policies for the 
identification and protection of national CII services not only because the government is 
solely responsible for establishing guidelines and to protect economic national security, 
but also as it holds a duty of care for the safe functioning and operation of which, affects 
all areas of citizens’ life. 
Then, to reach a comprehensive list of protection priorities of CII services, the goals and 
policies must be focussed on national interests, which are described in detail as: a set of 
achievable objectives, stakeholders involved, time and financial resources, during all 
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process of the identification of CII services. This step can give clarity to other steps, it 
allows for the visualization of scenarios, allocation of resources adequately and efforts’ 
rationalization.  
5.2 Identify	CII	operators	
The principal mission in this step is to display a list of CII operators instead of essential 
services. Therefore, this research proposes that potential public and private providers (CII 
operators) can be selected through the analysis of different factors, these are:  
1) The geographic area that could be affected; 
2) Operating income; 
3) Number of benefit users;  
4) Loss of human lives. 
This kind of information is highly important for any country because it can show the 
relationship among people, business services and the economy of the nation. In most 
cases, the potential CII operators have considerable geographic coverage and their 
business services influence a significant proportion of the population. For example, in 
Colombia if a company that offers electricity distribution service is under cyber attack, it 
not only has cyber dependence with other essential services, but also the energy sector 
represents 53% of the total operating income in Colombia19 and a disruption could 
inevitably affect people’s life, such as: hospital care, water distribution, food supply, etc. 
Therefore, selecting the CII operators based on geographic area, financial data, loss of 
human lives, and number of benefit users allow to the government to make sure that at 
least the majority of the essential services can be taken into account regardless of whether 
a CI sector is considered as critical or not. 
5.3 Establish	generic	criticality	criteria	
This step establishes a minimum criterion for the identification of decentralized essential 
services where its possible failures can impact negatively or became intolerable for society 
[12]. As shown in the previous chapter the criticality criteria could be calculated with the 
correct and available information, the generic criticality criteria establishes in this work 
are:  
Generic criticality criteria: 
1) Public health and safety impact; 
2) Economy impact; 
3) Psychological impact; 
4) Political/Governance impact; 
5) Dependence impact.  
Factors: 
1) Effects of time; 
2) Magnitude; 
3) Scope distribution.  
Nevertheless, as is described in the Chapter 3: Generic Criticality Criteria for a Quick-
Prioritize; this list is designed in adjustable way, in order for stakeholders to adapt a 
criterion vertically and/or a factor in order horizontal accordingly; and, each range of time, 
                                                
19 Superinterndencia de Sociedades (2015). The largest companies of Colombia. Viewed on 09-Feb-16. Retrieved from 
http://goo.gl/raExgT  
35 
 
level of gravity and scope distribution can adapt their percentages or proportions 
depending on national needs. 
5.4 Apply	a	BIA	and	risks	assessment	
First of all, infrastructure owners are responsible for identifying their CII services based 
on suitable methodologies, where the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences of business 
services are correlated with information technology. One methodology uses a combination 
of Business Impact Analysis (BIA) and risk assessment, the main task is to identify the 
principal business services of the organization (importance), as well, as being a potential 
target from cyber attacks, malware, etc. (risk) [36][38][37]. 
On the one hand, risk assessment is the result of the intersection of threats, vulnerabilities 
and consequences associated with an incident by accidental or non-accidental cause [18]. 
In 2007, professor Herdenson established a formula for the calculation of risk, which is 
composed as follows [36]: Risk = Threats x vulnerabilities x consequences. 
 
Figure 14. Illustration of crossing among threat, vulnerability and consequences. 
Threat represents any person or event with the potential to cause damage in a system [49], 
then a potential unauthorized access to information of an essential service could be 
categorized as a threat including timeframe, technique and resources. Vulnerability is any 
weakness that could be exploited by someone else [49], for example unpatched-software 
that has access to the information stored in a database. And, consequence is the amount of 
loss or number of the population affected from a successful cyber attack. 
On the other hand, the task of BIA is to identify the essential services and to understand 
the impact and effect the disruption or failures of these processes have on a company; 
actually, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery for IT Professionals book proposes 
seven steps to perform a formal BIA, such as [37]: 
1) Identify principal business processes; 
2) Establish requirements for essential service recovery; 
3) Determine technical, financial and human resource dependencies; 
4) Determine impact on operations; 
5) Develop priorities of business processes; 
6) Develop recovery time requirements; 
7) Calculate operational, legal, and financial impact of disruption. 
Therefore, this step includes a combination of the BIA and risks assessment in order to 
understand more broadly the correlation of the essential business services and potential 
threats; in fact, the purpose is for operators to estimate the impact of downtime of each 
essential services and the elements that will be impacted after the failure; as a result of this 
combination each CII operator is able to establish an effective business continuity plan 
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that includes an analysis of financial impact and operational impact of any essential 
business service disruption as a mitigation strategy, which is part of the security and 
emergency manager plans of the nation [38][37]. 
5.5 Identify	CII	services	
The increasing reliance of essential services on Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) assigns important responsibilities for organizations and governments 
[15], who have to secure the proper functioning and to reduce the impact or consequences 
from a cyber attack.  
The purpose of this step is to assign the responsibility to each CII operator to describe 
their services that its core activity depends on ICTs. As is visualized in the previous 
chapter to reach this mission each CII operator should apply the generic criticality criteria 
generated by the national decision makers, the essential services can be located in a range 
of values in order to map the final list of national protection priorities of CII services.  
5.6 Report	continuity	plan	
As a result of the combination of the BIA and risk assessment and after the application of 
criticality criteria to each essential service, CII operators must report the prioritization core 
business processes, which contain the identification of assets, vulnerabilities and threats, 
as well as the evaluation of options for recovery; in other words, this plan at a higher level 
describes the measures to be taken to mitigate and minimize the effects during and after a 
failure or a significant disruption of an essential service [38][40]. Although, the real 
elements depend on a government’s needs, such as particular hazards, priorities and 
responsibilities, there is a minimum of elements that a continuity plan includes [35]:  
1) Name of essential service; 
2) Sector it belongs; 
3) Channels of communication in case of a cyber incident; 
4) Historical incidents or failures; 
5) Recovery time and duration; 
6) Linkage among third-party services and technical staff for recovery of an essential 
service. 
5.7 Identify	cyber	dependencies	
Cyber dependence is a relationship among essential services, where one essential service 
can influence the state of the others[1][17][18]. Therefore cyber dependence may help to 
identify services as critical because their connections can demonstrate that one service in 
whatever kind of relationship such as direct, indirect or interdependence may cause 
disruption or failures on others by its cascading effects [7].  
Collaborating institutions such as national CERT, universities and/or organizations 
devoted to release guidelines and identify CII services could help to correlate this kind of 
interconnectivity by using two perspectives [7]: 
1) Intra-sector dependencies, means that CII services that belong to specific CI sector 
can have a strong relationship among other essential services in the same sector; 
2) Cross-sector dependencies, is the result of an intersection of the interconnectivity 
among CI sectors, such as: electricity, which has a strong influence on other CI 
sectors. 
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The importance of the identification of cyber dependence among essential services and 
cross-sector industry can aid in understanding and analysing the impact of cascading 
failures on the CII services as a system. As is illustrated below, the red line exemplifies 
the probable cyber dependence among services and the blue line represents the strong 
dependence of society on CII services for their proper functioning. 
 
Figure 15. Illustration of potential cyber dependencies between CII services. 
5.8 List	CI	services,	operators	and	sectors	
This is the last step of the flow of information between stakeholders, which is based on the 
final list of essential services enumerated in the table of protection priorities, it recursively 
could make a list of CII operators involved as well as a list of CI sectors. Indeed, in 
accordance with Estonia, the importance is to identify and ensure essential services that 
really should be protected against malware or cyber attack, and illustrate that its failure or 
disruption could be negatively reflected in society. The following table exemplifies the 
final list of national protection priorities: 
Table 10. List of CII services, operators and sectors sorted by protection priorities. 
# CII service CII operator CII sector Criticality ranking 
List of cyber 
dependencies 
1      
2      
Although, the final list of national protection priorities could include a large number of CII 
services for some countries, it may be influenced by national needs, political decisions, 
priorities, responsibilities and characteristic specific to each nation. To illustrate this point, 
if a hospital care or emergency healthcare service that is located at the end of the list 
suffers a cyber attack, it would likely cause loss of human lives; because of their cyber 
dependent on ICT. Therefore, in order to have a representative number of CII services 
according to available human, financial and technical resources, the recommendation in 
this step is focused on the highest criticality ranking and those potential CII services that 
could cause loss of human life by a disruption. 
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6 The	Case	Study	of	Colombia	
The identification of the national stakeholders, as an accurate terminology for establishing 
a common understanding of the terms, including the calculating process for criticality 
ranking that work as an adaptable matrix, and an illustrative framework called as 360-
DEGREE-FEEDBACK are the basis to offer an alternative instrument that could be used 
for collecting relevant information for country as Colombia that have not yet identified 
their CII services. Therefore, the following case study is based on some secondary 
statistical information of Colombia; the case’s description represents the analysis of 
behaviour of potential CII services. Nonetheless, this illustration does not pretend to 
display a real list of Colombia' CII services because the criticality criteria ranking does not 
belong to the nation' characteristics. On the contrary, this hypothetical scenario is used to 
exemplify the relationship between two essential services and map the likely position of 
them in the table of national protection priorities. 
To illustrate this point, in 2011 the National Planning Department of Colombia released a 
policy20 on cyber security and cyber defence, which contains an analysis of its core 
problem in that country, and assigning specific policies to regulatory bodies and advisory 
agencies in CI. In addition, this official document includes a plan of action, which 
enumerates 33 tasks with their respective stakeholders, cost of implementation and 
timeframe. Then, countries that want to apply the 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK framework 
need to establish achievable goals during all process of the identification of CII services in 
order to assign specific tasks to stakeholders involved. The following goals are defined in 
order to exemplify this step: 
Goals: 
1) Collect and analyse data and documents such as: policies and guidelines released 
by government, in order to know the priorities and current situation for the 
identification of nation’s CII services; 
2) Analyse the largest companies of the country organised in descending order by 
operating income that allow selecting the potential CII operators; 
3) Establish the list of generic criticality criteria with their percentages and 
proportions per each range of time, levels of gravity and scope distributions based 
on national interest; 
4) Each CII operator should apply its own combination of business impact analysis 
and risk assessment, and its applicability will be randomly audited by the national 
CERT; 
5) Based on generic criticality criteria established by national decision makers each 
CII operator will display a list of their essential business services; 
6) CII operators should periodically generate a report continuity plan, which will be 
collected by collaborating institutions; 
7) Based on the list of essential services and the continuity plan generated by CII 
operators, collaborating institutions will analyse the potential cyber intra-sector 
and cross-sector dependencies and associated cascading effects. 
The national decision makers would be responsible for analysing the factors, such as: 
operating income; the geographic area; loss of human life; and, number of benefit users 
that could be affected by a disruption. Nevertheless, in order to exemplify and avoid 
                                                
20 CONPES document. Op. cit. 
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disclosure of sensitive information only public financial information would be analysed to 
select the potential CII operators of Colombia.  
According to the World Bank21, in 2014 the GDP of Colombia was of US $377,7 million. 
The figures below show the influence of the first 100 companies22 with the highest 
operating income in Colombia grouped by sectors. This illustrates that the companies that 
belong to the energy sector should be taken into account as CII operators; followed by the 
manufacturing sector and, sequentially by the food, finance and ICT sectors. However, In 
order to ensure that all essential services are taken into account, this comprehensive 
instrument considers that in a real scenario a large representative number of companies 
should be analysed and sorted by operating income, loss of human life, geographic area 
and the number of benefit users regardless of whether they belong or not to a specific CI 
sector. 
  
Figure 16. List of the first 100 companies grouped by sectors. 
Assuming that the generic criticality criteria proposed in the chapter 4, is considered as an 
accurate list for Colombia based on its own hazards, characteristics and priorities, which 
led to political decisions and national decision makers establish these criteria as critical, 
allowing for prioritization of each criterion that is represented by acronym “Pn” with the 
values below, as shown: 
Criticality criteria: 
1) Public health and safety impact.  P1=5 
2) Economy impact.                         P2=4 
3) Psychological impact.                  P3=3 
4) Political/Governance impact.       P4=2 
5) Dependence impact.                     P5=1 
Generic factors: 
1) Effects of time. 
2) Magnitude. 
3) Scope distribution.  
Actually, to perform a formal BIA it is required as having the right to access specific data 
of particular CII operator, this information is used to determine the potential effects that 
can cause an interruption of an essential business service on each area or department [37]. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid divulging classified information from any company, this 
section establishes some tables with imaginary data that could be used for collecting the 
information in each of the departments of a company based on the seven steps established 
by professor Snedaker [37], as shown below: 
 
 
 
                                                
21 The World Bank. (2016). Data of Colombia. Viewed on 10-Feb-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/4srcAO  
22 Superinterndencia de Sociedades. Op. cit.  
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Table 11. Description of CII services belong to electricity subsector. 
Description 
CII services Distribution, generation, transmission and electricity market 
CII operator CII operator X 
CII subsector Electricity 
CII sector Energy 
1) Identify principal business processes: 
Table 12. Description of the departments of CII operators. 
Department Overview 
Department name Distribution department 
Name of BIA respondent Luis Carlos Herrera 
BIA respondent’s phone  +37259174418 
BIA respondent’s e-mail  Carlos.herrera.velasquez@hotmail.com  
Table 13. Description of all business processes for each department. 
# Business Process Description of Business Process 
1 Distribution Operations 
Transfer of power from regional transmission networks to 
the home of the end-user, including its connection and 
measurement. 
2 Distribution Commercial 
Purchase/sale of electricity on the wholesale market. 
Transfer of power from/to principal transmission 
networks to/from other electricity distribution companies. 
2). Establish requirements for business service recovery: 
Each business process requires defining the system resources used in that process, which 
its core activity depends on ICT. Recovery Time Object (RTO) represents the time 
available to restore a system after a disaster, then to get systems back up and running is 
shown in the table below [37]: 
Table 14. List of system resources per business process. 
# Business Process System Resources  RTO 
1 Distribution Operations 
PRIME READ 18 hours to recovery 
SCADA 24 hours to recovery 
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# Business Process System Resources  RTO 
2 Distribution Commercial SPARD 18 hours to recovery 
3) Determine technical and human resource dependencies: 
To estimate this kind of dependency requires access to available, sensitive and accurate 
data. However, in order to give a tool for displaying this correlated information, the table 
below could be used: 
Table 15. Technical and human resource dependencies. 
# Business Process Technical Resource (IT) Dependencies 
Human Resource 
Dependencies 
1 Distribution Operations 
SPARD Distribution application, 
Databases, routers, switches, PRIME 
READ application, transmission system, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA), Outage Management System 
(OMS), ION enterprise. 
105 Electricity distribution 
workers, 2 systems 
administrator, 1 Database 
administrator, 1 IT security, 
2 specialists in Telecom, and 
9 electrical engineers. 
2 Distribution Commercial 
Remote Terminal Units, Programme 
Logical Controller, Telemetry system, 
SPARD Distribution application, 
Databases, routers, switches, PRIME 
READ application, transmission system, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA), Outage Management System 
(OMS), ION enterprise. 
8 Electricity distribution 
workers, 3 assistant, 1 
systems administrator, 1 
accounting manager, and 3 
electrical engineers. 
4) Determine impact on operations: 
The table below describes the use of the system resources in each business process, which 
makes it easy to interpret, analyse and calculate the impact of disruption of a particular 
system resource. 
Table 16. Potential impact on operations. 
# Business Process 
System 
Resource Potential Operation Loss Provider/OS/Version 
1 Distribution Operations SCADA  
A shutdown of three power 
distribution lines, which would 
impact 2 of the 23 regions of 
Colombia, and massive failures in 
other power plants. 
Survalent 
2 Distribution Commercial SPARD 
Loss of capacity to sell/buy 
electricity on the wholesale 
market. 
Energy Computer 
Systems (ORACLE – 
UNIX) 
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5) Develop priorities of business processes: 
There are four types of categories for the prioritization of a business service by BIA, these 
are: critical, vital, important and minor; this means that the CII operators focus the most 
time on evaluating the critical business services [37] in order to identify their CII services. 
Table 17. List of priorities of business processes. 
# Business Process Priority System Resources  RTO 
1 Distribution Operations Critical SCADA 24 hours to recovery 
2 Distribution Commercial Critical SPARD 18 hours to recovery 
6) Develop recovery time requirements: 
For accomplishing this section, it requires describing the following terms: 
Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD) is the result of the following mathematical 
operation MTD=RTO+WRT, it means that a MTD is the maximum time a business can 
tolerate the unavailability of a specific business process; therefore, if a business process is 
classified as critical, it will have a shortest MTD [37]. 
Work Recovery Time (WRT) refers to the time it takes to get critical business functions 
back to normal, once the system is re-established, for example: if a system is disrupted by 
a failure, and the MTD is 72 hours, then 24 hours might be the RTO and 48 hours might 
be the WRT. Therefore, it means that WTR requires appropriate time to check and ensure 
that the logs, databases, services, etc., are available after to restore the system; in others 
words, RTO represents the time available to restore a system after a disaster (to get 
systems back up and running), and WTR symbolises the time (which is twice as long as 
RTO) to get critical business back [37], as shown in fig. 17. 
Recovery Point Objective (RPO) indicates the amount of data loss that can be tolerated by 
failure’s critical business process, for example: if a CII operator performs real-time data 
backup weekly, then it could tolerate the loss of a week’s worth of information [37]. 
Then, The following table and figure show the relationship among MTD, WRT and RTO: 
Table 18. Illustrating calculation of MTD and RPO. 
# Business Process MTD WRT RTO RPO 
1 Distribution Operations 72 hours 48 hours 24 hours  2 days 
2 Distribution Commercial 54 hours  36 hours 18 hours 1 week 
 
Figure 17. Illustrating calculation of MTD and RPO. 
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7) Calculate operational, legal, and financial impact of disruption: 
The disruption of a business service can cause high operational troubles, because a single 
incident can not only damage others services on a CII operator, but also the 
malfunctioning of this would inevitably affecting people’s lives and economy of a nation 
[12]. Then, the business services classified in BIA as critical require significant efforts, 
such as: human, technical, financial resources in order to get business functions back to 
normal as soon as possible after they suffer a disruption; as such recovery time is often 
defined in hours instead of days or weeks [37]. Then, each CII operator should be able to 
calculate the effects of a disruption of their business services in terms of legal, financial 
and operational impacts of disruption. To illustrate this point, according to Symantec 
Corporation report23, in 2013 the costs of cyber crime in Colombia amounted to COP 
(Colombian Pesos) 873 million, those malware and cyber attacks affected all sectors, 
generating consequences on society, such as: unavailable access to information system, the 
theft of personal identity, loss of information, loss of operational capacity, among them. 
On the other hand, once the business impact analysis has been completed, the next step is 
to assess risks. This can determine the likelihood, potential severity and the number of 
people (including: employees, customers, users, visitors, etc.) exposed to a particular 
hazard [37]. Therefore, IT components must be identified individually in order to take into 
account the potential intra-sector, cross-sector and cross-border dependencies that can be 
affected. Although, risk assessment is the result of the intersection of threats, 
vulnerabilities and consequences associated with an incident by accidental or non-
accidental cause [18], the risk level could be interpreted as a combination of likelihood 
(frequency) and impact (severity). Then, once the risk assessment and a BIA have been 
applied, each CII operator must report to national decision makers the intersection among 
them, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 18. Result of calculation of threat, vulnerability and consequences. 
Table 19. List of business process and risk identified. 
# Business Process 
Risk 
Identified Potential Operation Loss 
Potential 
Financial 
Loss 
End-users 
affected RTO 
1 Distribution Operations 
RISK-01 
RISK-02 
A shutdown of seven 
electricity distribution 
lines in Colombia, causing 
massive failures in other 
power plants. 
USD 2.5 
million 
1.43 million 
of customers 
24 
hours 
                                                
23 https://www.symantec.com/content/es/mx/about/presskits/b-norton-report-2013-infographic.es_mx.pdf  
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# Business Process 
Risk 
Identified Potential Operation Loss 
Potential 
Financial 
Loss 
End-users 
affected RTO 
1 Distribution Commercial RISK-01 
A shutdown of transfer of 
power from/to principal 
transmission networks 
to/from other electricity 
distribution companies. 
USD 4.5 
million 
3 power 
distribution 
lines and 1.43 
million of 
customers 
18 
hours 
Continuing with the hypothetical case that a cyber attack is launched against some 
electrical substation plants in Colombia, which causes a power cut to a large part of their 
population, and essential services as electricity distribution is suddenly not available for a 
substantial period of time. And, in 2014 the total electricity traded in Colombia was 
85,390 GWh24. Therefore, the next calculating ranking helps to understand protection 
priorities for CII services: 
Table 20. Description of CII operator X, the case of Colombia. 
Description 
CII service Distribution 
CII operator Provider X 
CII subsector Electricity 
CII sector Energy 
Total of electrical substations 7 plants  
Colombia’s population  47,790,000 people (According to the World Bank25) 
Percentage of end-users 3% of the population in Colombia 
Total electricity traded by Provider X 2,561 GWh 
For calculating the potential public health and safety impact, the following three steps are 
required: 
a) Effects of time: It represents the timeframe of perceiving the consequences on the 
customers, such as: hospitals, home heating systems, etc. Based on, previous real 
scenarios, such as: the cyber attack against Ukraine in 2015, which illustrated the cyber 
dependence of society on electricity and telecommunication; this cyber attack suddenly 
caused a power cut. And, another case occurred in 2006 when a shutdown of an electricity 
distribution line in Germany caused massive failures in other power plants located in Italy, 
France, Netherlands, Belgium, etc., in not more than 6 hours, which affected more than 15 
million customers [50]. Therefore, this hypothetical scenario assumes that the timeframe 
of perceiving the consequences on people into the nation is in the range of 0 to 24 hours. 
                                                
24 XM. (2016). Statistical data of electricity distribution. Colombia. Viewed on 10-Feb-16. Retrieved from 
http://goo.gl/agMEie  
25 The World Bank. Op. cit. 
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Table 21. Effect of time in hours, the case of Colombia. 
Range in hours More than 60 48 to 60 36 and 48 24 and 36 0 and 24 
Value 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Magnitude: To determine the appropriate probability level requires the application of a 
security framework as ISO 2700126, MIL-STD-882E27, etc. However, in order to illustrate 
this process the calculation of value will be assumed without real and accurate analysis. 
Acknowledging that the lights came back on three hours later and workers had to go to 
substations to close breakers. And, assuming that this probably occurs sometimes 
(Probable) that there is a significant health impact of 3% of the population in Colombia 
(Marginal). It is rated as:  
Table 22. Level of impact took from MIL-STD-882E, the case of Colombia. 
 Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
Catastrophic 5 5 5 4 3 
Critical 5 5 4 3 3 
Marginal 4 4 3 3 3 
Negligible 3 3 2 2 1 
c) Scope distribution: Colombia is home to 47.79 million people. Regarding the cyber 
attack, which affected an electric utility in 7 of its substations, and killed electricity to 1.43 
million of customers, which represents 3% of the total of population in Colombia. It is 
rated as: 
Table 23. Percentage of population affected, the case of Colombia. 
Percentage of population affected Value 
More than 5% 5 
In the range of 4% and 4.99% 4 
In the range of 3% and 3.99% 3 
In the range of 2% and 2.99% 2 
In the range of 0.5% and 1.99% 1 
Then, the value per each criterion is calculated by a mathematical operation called as Rn, 
where n is the number that represents each column, as shown below:  
                                                
26 ISMS Auditing Guideline (2008). ISO 27001 Security. Viewed on 20-Mar-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/GTI3Ug  
27 Department of Defense Standard Practices. (2012). System Safety. Viewed on 20-Mar-16. Retrieved from 
http://goo.gl/sLNP3S  
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Figure 19. Calculating sub process of public health and safety impact. 
In order to avoid the same process several times with each of the five criteria as done in 
the previous three steps, the following table is the final result, which was calculated 
through a static testing and their values was estimated by using real statistics28 with an 
imaginary scenario, which aims to map a illustrating final list of national protection 
priorities of CII services. 
 
Figure 20. Calculating process for CII operator, the case of Colombia. 
The previous step helps to understand protection priorities per each essential service 
offered by CII operators and improves prediction of failures at a certain decisive moment. 
Concluding that the final value indicates that the CII operator called as “Provider X” 
belongs to the national services CII; based on a hypothetical scenario and that CII operator 
only provides electricity distribution to 3% of the population in Colombia. Even though, 
this means if someone executes a cyber attack against a CII service, cyber dependence 
could disturb other essential services, and the malfunction would significantly affect more 
than 1.43 million people.  
Independently and separate from the final result of this case study, it can be shown that CII 
services become most evident and tangible in the case of a real failure after a cyber attack, 
when its essential services, such as electricity distribution, are suddenly not available 
anymore or for a substantial period of time.  
Taking another essential services as an example, the aeronautical agency reported that in 
2014 aviation industry carried a total of 36,134,568 passengers29. In order to continue 
illustrating this imaginary case, one of the largest airlines in Colombia released some 
statistical data about their service, these are:  
Table 24. Description of CII operator Y, the case of Colombia. 
                                                
28 Ministry of ICT, UPME (2014). Data of Colombia. Viewed on 20-Mar-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/w3Xzar, 
http://goo.gl/7q2cRd and http://goo.gl/tXK2fZ  
29 Aeronautical Civil. Op. cit. 
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Description 
CII service Airports Operations 
CII operator Provider Y 
CII subsector Aviation 
CII sector Transport  
Total airplanes More than 140 airplanes30  
Colombia’s population  47,790,000 people (According to the World Bank31) 
Total passengers carried in Colombia 46,134,568 passengers 
“Provider Y” carried a total of 26,230,000 passengers32 
Percentage of end-users 56.86% of total passengers in Colombia 
This particular case shows that the total passengers carried by “Provider Y” was 56.86% 
of total passengers; making it a potential CII operator for Colombia, that means if 
someone executes a cyber attack against Provider Y’s airports operations services, this 
would stop all air traffic, and the malfunction would significantly affect the population in 
Colombia. In addition, cyber dependence could disturb other vital services as 
meteorological monitoring, food distribution, emergency and air rescue, etc. As illustrated 
below: 
 
Figure 21. Illustration of calculation of the final value for each CII service. 
Furthermore, a report continuity plan at a higher level describes the measures to be taken 
to mitigate and minimize the effects during and after a failure or a significant disruption of 
an essential service, it includes certain minimum elements, which are considered as 
classified information for goverments and organizations. Then, the data must be handled 
with high levels of protection in order to prevent leakage of information. A continuity plan 
can be reported by the following tables: 
Table 25. Briefly report continuity plan. 
                                                
30 Avianca Airline (2016). Our Fleet. Viewed on 22-Mar-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/qjo2vs  
31 The World Bank. Op. cit. 
32 Avianca. Operational Statistics. Viewed on 22-Mar-16. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/Paguck  
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Briefly Report Continuity Plan 
CII operator Provider X 
CII subsector Electricity 
CII sector Energy 
Channels of communication  E-mail, mobile phone. 
Respondent’s phone  +37259174418 
Respondent’s e-mail  Carlos.herrera.velasquez@hotmail.com  
 
CII service Electricity Distribution 
# Business Process RTO Risks Responsible 
1 Distribution Operations 24 hours RISK-01 / 02 Luis Carlos Herrera 
2 Distribution Commercial 18 hours RISK-01 Juan Camilo Hernandez 
In addition, cyber dependence may help to identify services as critical because their 
connections can demostrate that one CII service may cause disruption on others by its 
cascading effects [1][17][18]. In order to identify the intra-sector and cross-sector cyber 
dependencies, the following table can illustrate the likely relationship between potential 
CII services. This information should be gathered during the implementation of a 
combination of BIA and risk assessments, and be analysed by collaborating institutions. 
Due to the detail of this kind of relationship it is to be considered as classified information 
for governments; this research proposes the following table in order to be used for 
correlating the interconnectivity between CII services.  
The table also illustrates the dependence levels that a stakeholder can define for describing 
the cyber dependence of one CII service in function of risk in another (H: high, M: 
medium, and L: low), for example: if airport operations depend on electricity distribution, 
and electricity distribution has a high risk of disruption, the probability of airport operation 
disruption is correspondingly higher; because the airport operations has a high dependence 
(H) on electricity distribution. 
 
Figure 22. Illustration of cyber dependencies; H=high, M=medium, and L=low. 
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As a result, the 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK framework recursively could present a list of 
CII services, CII operators involved and CI sectors as well as a list of criticality ranking. 
Although, only two CII services with real statistical data were analysed in a hypothetical 
scenario, the national protection priorities would be listed in the order shown below: 
Table 26. List of CI services, operators and sectors analysed during the process. 
# CII Service CII Operator CII Sector End-users affected 
Criticality 
Ranking 
Cyber 
dependence 
1 Airport operation Provider Y Transport 
26 million 70 Electricity distribution 
2 Electricity distribution Provider X Energy 
1.43 million + 
3 electricity 
distribution 
companies  
49.67 … 
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7 Conclusions	
The development of a comprehensive instrument for Identifying Critical Information 
Infrastructure (CII) services was achieved due to: 
1) The identification of main stakeholders, which was hierarchically organised to 
make it easier to interpret and to avoid unnecessary confusion;  
2) A calculating process for criticality ranking that works as an adjustable matrix, 
where each criterion with its range of time, level of gravity and scope distribution 
can adapt their percentages or proportions depending on national needs and 
characteristics to be applied to each country; and,  
3) The design of such framework is called 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK; this describes 
the flow of information among stakeholders based on eight specific steps.  
The above three components are the basis to offer a comprehensive instrument that may be 
used for collecting information for countries that have not yet identified their CII services 
as was exemplified in the case study of Colombia. Also where two potential CII services 
were mapped as illustrated in the table of national protection priorities, ordering the 
corresponding values of each criticality ranking in descending order, leaving till last the 
smallest value. 
Actually, the identification of CII services has been made possible and is viable because 
the 360-DEGREE-FEEDBACK framework. The framework follows a step-by-step 
template of the principal tasks for identification of essential services. On-going interaction 
among the main stakeholders is key; both stakeholders and the list of tasks were shown to 
be equally as important as each other and their interaction may lead to work on all levels at 
the same time, in order to keep a continues communication that allows exchanging 
information and resources during the process.  
In addition, one of the keys to reach this achievement was to extract the CII services from 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) to be analysed as a whole system; as well as, to describe the 
importance of society on essential services that its core process depends on Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT). Indeed, if a cyber attack is carried out against a 
CII service, it would impact on people’s lives, the economy of countries, and its essential 
services supply because of their cyber dependencies. In fact, cyber dependence not only 
brings benefits like information sharing or rationalized efforts, but also if a CII service is 
interrupted the probability of disruptions of other services is potentially very high and may 
have a cascading effect, which could spread to other countries, due to the nature of their 
cyber dependence and not the physicality of their land borders. 
However, the result of identification of CII services belonging to any country required 
some additional issues that are not included in this research, such as training of staff, 
founding of Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and creating cross-sector 
teams to discuss decisions and criteria, among them.  
Although, this instrument was not validated due to the need for a real scenario to illustrate 
the applicability that could consume years or decades for testing and analysing their 
viability according to population, economy and characteristic of each nation; a separate 
case of study was conducted using secondary statistical data from Colombia with a 
hypothetical scenario, in order to illustrate a particular case and offer an exemplifying 
procedure that could be used for guiding the collection of information to identify those CII 
services whose core activity relies on ICT.   
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Therefore, the identification process is the first step to protect CII services against 
malware or cyber attacks. Consequently, once countries have successfully identified, 
classified and prioritized its own national CII services, future works could combine this 
research with new concepts such as cross-border dependencies, which would not only 
enhance CII services protection within the territory, but also allow for mitigating and 
mapping the potential cascading effects by disruption of an interconnected service outside 
of the nation. 
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Appendix	
I. Semi-structure	qualitative	interviews	
1) How would you define "Critical Information Infrastructure"? 
2) What is the relationship between Critical Infrastructure and Critical Information 
Infrastructure? 
3) What set of (technical or otherwise) capabilities must have a CERT for protecting 
Critical information Infrastructure Services?  
4) What criteria will you use to identify Critical Information Infrastructure services? 
5) Would you like to add any relevant information to contribute to this research? 
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